Cade Cunningham and the Off-Ball Equation: What Are the Detroit Pistons Looking For?

When I reviewed the Detroit Pistons' playoff film last season, one number stopped me. Not the points, not the rebounds, but Cade Cunningham's efficiency when he played off the ball: 1.41 points per possession, ranking in the 96.6th percentile league-wide. Meanwhile, his efficiency as a pick-and-roll ball handler was just 0.87, and isolation was 0.76. This gap is not a minor difference – it is a major signal about how the team is reshaping its offensive system.

The context of the issue lies in Cunningham's development history. Since being selected with the No. 1 pick in 2026, he has almost always been the primary offensive initiator. In the 2026-25 season, he played all 82 games, averaging about 23 points, 4 rebounds, and 7 assists – very solid numbers on a team that won only 14 games in 2026-24. But the way the team operated, with Cunningham handling the ball so much, created a predictable style of play. Opponents knew the ball would go through his hands in most situations.

What's interesting is that postseason data tells a different story. In a small sample – just 41 catch-and-shoot attempts and 18 shots with 1-2 dribbles – Cunningham shot 48.8% from three on catch-and-shoot opportunities. His spot-up efficiency was 1.30 points per possession (84th percentile), and no-dribble handoffs were 1.41 (96.6th percentile). These are notable numbers, but I always remind myself: numbers don't lie, but those who choose the numbers can. A small playoff sample could reflect the truth, or it could just be a fortunate moment.

The key point the Detroit coaching staff is aiming for is a transition from a system that depends entirely on Cunningham handling the ball to a more balanced one, where he runs off screens and Ausar Thompson takes on the role of secondary creator. This is not a new idea in modern basketball – we've seen this model with Jokic and Murray in Denver, where the biggest star doesn't necessarily have to be the one handling the ball the most. But for Cunningham, who has been used to controlling the ball from start to finish, this is a major shift in mindset.

This equation has a solution thanks to the roster reconstruction. This past summer, the Pistons brought in four players who shot over 40% from three last season: Isaiah Joe, John Collins, Taurean Prince, and Tobias Harris. Their presence creates the space Cunningham needs to run off the ball. When you have reliable shooters at four positions on the floor, using pindown screens and handoffs becomes much more effective. Opponents can't collapse on Cunningham while ignoring the others.

But I want to emphasize one thing: the success of this plan depends heavily on the development of Ausar Thompson. The 23-year-old has elite defensive potential, but his shooting and playmaking remain big question marks. If Thompson can't become a reliable initiator, opponents will simply leave him open on the perimeter and focus their attention on Cunningham. When that happens, the entire off-ball system collapses. This is the biggest risk that The Athletic's analysis pointed out, and I completely agree.

Another point to consider is Cunningham's ability to adapt to a new role. Throughout his career, he has almost always been the primary ball handler. Transitioning to off-ball movement requires patience and spatial awareness – skills that not everyone can develop immediately. However, postseason data suggests Cunningham can adapt. He played better when not under constant ball-handling pressure, and this could help him conserve energy for crucial moments of the game.

I once thought I was right. Qatar taught me to be wrong. In basketball, too, we often rush to conclusions from small data samples. 41 catch-and-shoot attempts in the playoffs is not a large enough number to definitively claim that Cunningham will maintain 48.8% efficiency throughout the season. But it's large enough to raise a valuable question: what would happen if we gave him more opportunities like that?

A counterintuitive perspective I want to offer: maybe the problem isn't Cunningham, but how we evaluate his performance. When a player plays in a lineup lacking spacing, his on-ball metrics will be negatively affected. Pick-and-roll with a lineup without shooters is much easier to defend. So Cunningham's 0.87 PPP in pick-and-roll might not reflect his true ability. If the new shooters force opponents to respect the perimeter, his on-ball efficiency could automatically improve without any tactical changes.

This leads me to an important question: are we underestimating the influence of roster quality on individual performance? For years, we've tended to attribute a player's success or failure entirely to themselves. But basketball is a team sport, and no one can shine in a system lacking support. Cunningham might already be a better player than his numbers suggest – he just hasn't had the right pieces around him.

Tactically, I want to analyze deeper how the Pistons can implement this system. Pindown screens for Cunningham on both wings are a natural option. With big men like Jalen Duren or John Collins setting screens, Cunningham can utilize his catch-and-shoot ability. Handoffs are also a potent weapon, especially when Thompson handles the ball and Cunningham runs through to receive it in space. These situations create more flexibility and are harder to predict than having Cunningham handle the ball and call a pick-and-roll at the top of every possession.

However, I also notice a blind spot in The Athletic's analysis: they don't address how to counter teams that choose to switch everything or go under screens. If opponents decide to switch every pindown situation, Cunningham will face one-on-one matchups against big men – which could lead to inefficient contested mid-range shots. Or if they choose to go under screens, Cunningham will have space to shoot threes, but if he doesn't convert at a high rate, the plan will fail. These are situations the coaching staff needs a Plan B for.

Another factor to consider is Thompson's injury history. He suffered an ankle sprain last season, raising questions about his durability in a more significant role. If Thompson can't maintain good health, the entire plan collapses, and the Pistons will have to revert to the old system – Cunningham handling the ball more. This is a significant risk the team's management needs to account for.

Looking at the bigger picture, I believe the Detroit Pistons are heading in the right direction. They are no longer a tanking team but are transitioning to competing at the play-in or low-seed level in the Eastern Conference. With the addition of quality shooters and Thompson's development, they could reach 35-40 wins – a significant improvement from 14 wins in 2026-24. But to do that, they need to be patient with the development process and ready to adjust when things don't go as planned.

When the court is empty, only data whispers the truth. And the data is telling us that Cunningham could be an even more efficient player if freed from the burden of ball handling. But is that enough to turn the Pistons into a team worth watching in the Eastern Conference? The answer depends on many variables – Thompson's health, the new shooters' ability to maintain their percentages, and Cunningham's adaptation to a new role. I'll be closely watching the first 20 games of the season for a clearer answer.

Every number is a confession, if we're patient enough to listen. And Cunningham's confession is saying that he could be a better player than what we've seen. The question is whether the Pistons have the patience to listen and act on what the data is whispering.