Indonesia Imports a Spine: Paes, Romeny and the Passport Question V-League Has Not Answered
Câu trả lời cốt lõi: Maarten Paes (thủ môn, sinh 1998) và Ole Romeny (tiền đạo) đủ điều kiện khoác áo đội tuyển Indonesia mà không cần dòng máu bản địa, thông qua tiêu chí ông bà sinh ra trên lãnh thổ của FIFA và Điều 20 Luật Quốc tịch Indonesia số 12/2006. Dữ kiện chính: - Maarten Paes được FIFA phê duyệt chuyển liên đoàn sang Indonesia tháng 4/2024, hoàn tất tháng 8/2024, sau khi từng đại diện U21 Hà Lan. - Ole Romeny tuyên thệ nhập quốc tịch Indonesia tháng 2/2025, sau khi Hạ viện Indonesia (DPR) phê duyệt hồ sơ. - Hai cầu thủ chiếm hai vị trí đòn bẩy cao nhất trong đội hình: thủ môn và tiền đạo trung tâm. - Cả hai đều vượt qua hai cánh cửa độc lập: luật quốc tịch Indonesia (Điều 20, Luật số 12/2006) và tiêu chí kết nối đáng kể trong quy định RGAS của FIFA về ông bà sinh ra trên lãnh thổ liên đoàn. - Đây không phải lỗ hổng pháp lý mà là quy tắc được thiết kế có chủ đích; điều kiện đủ điều kiện khác với việc có dòng máu bản địa. Nguồn: Tổng hợp từ báo chí Indonesia (Kompas) và hồ sơ công khai của PSSI/FIFA, tháng 2/2025. | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn Hỏi đáp liên quan: Hỏi: Indonesia có trả phí chuyển nhượng cho Paes và Romeny không? Đáp: Không, đây là kênh tuyển dụng phi chuyển nhượng; chi phí thực là hành chính, pháp lý và vốn chính trị. Hỏi: Vì sao Indonesia chọn đúng thủ môn và tiền đạo? Đáp: Hai vị trí này có đòn bẩy lớn nhất lên kết quả trận đấu, giúp tăng chất lượng đội tuyển nhanh hơn so với việc bổ sung ở biên. Hỏi: Nguồn cung hậu duệ này có giới hạn không? Đáp: Có, đây là nhóm dân cư lịch sử đã đóng lại, không tái tạo được, theo các chỉ số độ sâu đội hình của VangBong.vn Player Depth Index.
At one in the morning in February 2026, my phone buzzed. A friend who works in media for a club in Jakarta sent a hurriedly taken photo: Ole Romeny standing to attention, his right hand raised before the red-and-white flag, reading the oath of naturalisation. The image was slightly blurred, the kind you take from the third row with a phone. He added three words: "It's done."
I was sitting in a coffee shop on Hang Bong Street in Hanoi, pulling up an old note from my machine. In April 2026 I had jotted two lines about Maarten Paes — a goalkeeper born in 2026 who had just been approved by FIFA to switch federations to Indonesia, having previously played for the Netherlands at U21 level. My note that day read: "Worth tracking. Could be a regional turning point." Ten months later, Romeny followed.
Two men. One goalkeeper, one forward. Not a drop of indigenous blood in either bloodstream. Both have now worn the Indonesia national shirt entirely legally, with paperwork, with approval, with a stamp.
What I want Vietnamese fans to see lies elsewhere: a federation that has read the rules more carefully than the rest of Southeast Asia, and is using that understanding to close the gap. Back when I worked as a contributor for a club in Hanoi, I learned one thing from the coaches: on the pitch, the most expensive thing is not a goal, it is time. Indonesia has just bought time.
Two names, two doors, one family line half a world away
The PSSI did not do this in the dark. They did it methodically, and they did it over several years.
Maarten Paes was born in 2026 and plays in goal. He has grandparents born in the Dutch East Indies — the territory that is now Indonesia. That is his most important legal anchor. But his difficulty lay elsewhere: he had already represented the Netherlands at U21 level. To wear the Indonesia shirt he had to pass through the federation-transfer mechanism — something FIFA permits only once in a career, and only when very specific conditions on caps, age and competition are met. In April 2026 that door opened. In August 2026 the process was completed.
Ole Romeny took a shorter road, with less procedural resistance. He swore his oath of Indonesian citizenship in February 2026, after Indonesia's House of Representatives — known in the trade by the acronym DPR — approved the file.
Both men had to pass through two independent doors, and both did.
The first door is Indonesian nationality law, specifically Article 20 of Law No. 12/2026, which allows naturalisation on national-interest grounds under a procedure requiring parliamentary approval. It is an open-textured clause: it hands decision-making power to the state in cases deemed exceptional.
The second door is FIFA's regulations governing the application of the FIFA Statutes — known in the trade as RGAS. Within it sits the "substantial connection" criterion: a player may represent a federation if a biological parent or grandparent was born on that federation's territory.
Neither door requires a player to carry indigenous blood. That sounds cold written on paper, but it is precisely the design of the law. This is a point I will return to later, because it is the core of the misunderstanding now unfolding.
One thing I want to pause on: the origin of this cohort. The Dutch East Indies was a colony that existed for centuries. Over that time, a portion of Dutch and European settlers put down long-term roots, married, had children and never returned. In Dutch they are called by a word I like for its imagery: the stayers. Their descendants mostly migrated to the Netherlands after 2026, carrying European passports but still keeping in their family records a line noting where their grandparents were born.
That line is the asset.
Why a goalkeeper and a forward
This is the part I want to give the most space to, because it is the least discussed in regional coverage.
In football, not every position carries the same weight. A good full-back makes a team play better. A good goalkeeper makes a team avoid defeat. A good forward makes a team win. If you have one naturalisation slot, and only one, where do you put it?
The PSSI put theirs in the two most expensive places: the goalmouth and the attacking spine.
At national-team level, the biggest problem is not tactics. The biggest problem is familiarity. A national team gathers for three days, plays one match, then disperses. A back four may never have played together in a real shape, never have learned who likes to cover when, who drifts out of position when the ball switches. In that environment, a goalkeeper who can command, read situations and talk — loudly — is worth far more than a technically gifted winger.
When I sat in the stands at Hang Day during the 2026 to 2026 seasons, I noticed a small detail I still record every match. Every time the home side conceded, the first man to rise from the bench was usually the reserve goalkeeper, and the first to clap the back line back into shape was usually the captain-centre-back. Football runs on small signals like that. A goalkeeper who can calm a back line for seven minutes of the second half has contributed more than the stat sheet shows.
At the other end, a good forward solves the problem Southeast Asian football faces most: creating chances is fine, finishing them is not. In many V-League matches I have watched, teams create ten to fifteen chances and score one. That is a question of finishing quality, and finishing quality is the most expensive commodity on the international market.
In other words, Indonesia did not merely import players. They imported the two positions with the greatest leverage in football, and they did so exactly when the national team needed a spine.
That is a technical decision, not an accident.
On possession, and why it matters here
I have to state plainly something I have held in for a long time, and it bears directly on this story.
Possession is the most deceptive statistic in football. I have watched more than a few matches in which one side held sixty per cent of the ball, passed sideways all game, and lost one-nil. That sixty per cent looks lovely on a bulletin, but it measures touches in midfield, not the ability to create goals. It is a metric of ownership, not of danger.
What does this have to do with Paes and Romeny? Everything. When assessing Indonesia's upgrade, do not look at the numbers that will appear in the bulletins. Look at the structure of the squad. A team with a good goalkeeper and a good forward can play with forty per cent of the ball and still win. That is the most dangerous archetype in knockout football, and Indonesia is moving toward it.
I have no data to prove how much Indonesia will improve. Nobody does. Indonesian media write that the team has become "significantly stronger" — that is an assertion, not a measurement. No FIFA ranking points, no qualifier results, no comparative data of any kind were offered to quantify that leap.
I record this as a reminder to myself, because I know my own impulsiveness can push me into an overstatement: when there is no data, say there is no data. Emotion sets the question. Data provides the answer. Without an answer, there should be no declaration.
The pipeline and its fatal limit
This is the part I consider most important, and the least discussed in regional coverage.
Indonesia is not buying players in the transfer market. Indonesia is not paying a transfer fee for Paes or Romeny. What it pays is administrative cost, legal cost and political capital. It is an entirely different recruitment channel, one that bypasses the traditional transfer market, and it is far cheaper than developing a generation of players from age twelve to twenty-two.
Economically speaking, this is an investment that substitutes for youth-development spending. You do not build an academy, you do not nurture for fifteen years, you simply hire a good lawyer and a genealogist.
But it carries a fatal limit: supply is finite.
The cohort Indonesia is targeting is descended from Europeans who settled long-term in the Dutch East Indies. This is a historical population that has closed. No new generation is being born from that colony any more, because that colony no longer exists. Every time Indonesia calls up one of them, the pool drops a little, and no stream flows in.
This is the point I believe Indonesian analysts have not stated loudly enough: the model cannot be replicated indefinitely. It is like a club that only buys players and never develops them. In two or three years, the squad visibly improves. In ten years, if the academy is empty, the squad hits bottom.
Vietnam does not have that pool at an equivalent scale. Vietnam's colonial history is French, and the French-Vietnamese community is far smaller and far less connected to elite European football. This is a structural disadvantage, and I raise it not to complain but to frame the problem correctly. Vietnam cannot fix a structural disadvantage with administrative effort.
What Vietnam has is a different model: cohesion, development, mutual understanding. That is a slow but durable advantage. The problem is that, in the short term, the slow advantage usually loses to the fast one, and fans always live in the present tense.
The race the whole region is running
Indonesia is not alone on this road.
The Philippines have walked the naturalisation path for years, and they are the clearest example of both the upside and the downside. Malaysia is looking in that direction, with smaller-scale moves. Thailand has taken similar steps. Singapore has done it too.
When many federations do the same thing, the value of doing it declines. This is the basic logic of any race. If every Southeast Asian side naturalises European-descended players, the advantage of the first mover is flattened, and what remains is a contest of quantity and paperwork quality — a contest no one truly wins, because everyone pays the same kind of cost.
As someone who follows regional football, I find this more worrying than cheering. Because when federations pour resources into hunting descendants in Europe, they pour fewer resources into teaching a twelve-year-old in Quang Nam or Nghe An how to play.
That is a substitution, not a complement. And substitution always has a price. The question is not how much. The question is who pays, and for how long.
One further possibility worth tracking: FIFA may come under pressure to tighten the grandparent-birthplace criterion if the Southeast Asian naturalisation wave continues. If that happens, Indonesia's pool will dry up far faster than expected, and every long-term calculation built on it will have to be rewritten.
The contrarian view: "loophole" is the wrong word
Indonesian media describe the Paes and Romeny cases with a word I consider technically wrong: "legal loophole".
The grandparent-birthplace criterion is not a bug in the law. It is a deliberately designed rule. FIFA wants federations to be able to mobilise people with a historical connection to their territory, because FIFA understands that modern football is bound up with migration. If FIFA regarded it as a bug, they would have fixed it long ago.
The confusion lies in equating two concepts: eligibility and indigenous blood. They are different things. A person can be eligible to represent a country without carrying that country's blood. FIFA's rules permit this. Indonesian nationality law permits it too.
I am not saying there is nothing to discuss. I am saying the crowd is arguing about the wrong thing. And when the crowd argues about the wrong thing, the real risk is obscured.
Indonesia's real risk lies in two other places.
First, reputational risk. These two players will be scrutinised intensely — every run, every touch, every moment standing for the anthem. Every time they err, a section of the audience will blame the naturalisation policy rather than the individual. Every time the team loses, the question "what was naturalisation for" will return. This is a pressure that paperwork cannot resolve, because it does not originate in paperwork.
Second, dependency risk. If Paes is injured, or if Romeny loses form, the "Indonesia is significantly stronger" story will show its thin spots. A team is only as strong as what remains when its best players are absent. And a team built by importing a spine usually has few contingency plans for that spine itself.
There is one more thing few mention: integration. A player born in Utrecht, raised in Dutch football culture, needs time to understand an Indonesian dressing room — its unspoken rules, its jokes, its rituals. Talent solves many things, but it does not solve loneliness in a dressing room. I once watched a foreign player in the V-League go four months without wages, living alone in a rented flat, holding his spirit together only through three video calls a week with his family. Talent does not save a man in that situation. People do.
What I am tracking next
I will not conclude that Indonesia will win Southeast Asia. Football does not run on paperwork, but on afternoons on the training pitch, on whether a newly naturalised player can shake hands with a player born in Surabaya, on whether a coach can weld eleven people from seven cultures into one block. That is the hardest job in football, and no legal door opens for it.
Three signals I will log over the next twelve months.
One: whether the PSSI calls up further descendants, and in which positions. If the next wave lands at centre-back or holding midfield, that is a sign they are building an entire spine rather than just two ends.
Two: whether FIFA touches the grandparent criterion. This is the biggest variable, and the one outside the PSSI's control.
Three: how Vietnam's national team responds, and whether that response happens on the pitch or on paper. A federation that answers with academies is playing the long game. A federation that answers with naturalisation files is chasing.
If I had to bet on a single sentence, I would bet on this: within three years, Southeast Asian football will split into two groups — the player importers and the player developers. And the side that finds a way to stand between the two will be the champion. Not the side with the most passports, but the side that knows how to use passports to buy time, and then uses that time to build academies.
I wrote these lines at two in the morning, after replying to my friend in Jakarta with a single word: "Yeah." I could not sleep, because I know that descendant pool shrinks every day, and I know Vietnamese football stands at the same fork in the road — it is just that nobody has said it out loud. A passport can buy a player. It cannot buy a football nation. But it can buy exactly the stretch of time a football nation needs to grow up — if anyone knows how to use that time.
